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Introduction

I

n recent years, the Navy and other military services have increasingly evidenced
an environmental stewardship ethic in their operations. The impetus for this
new priority is of both internal and external origin. As microcosms of society, the
military services are comprised mainly of young Americans for whom
environmental responsibility is an imbued value. As these individuals have
assumed leadership positions, the military services have incrementally adopted an
environmental protection ethic.
An equal or greater impetus, however, stems from sources external to the
military services. Domestic law, including that which executes international
agreements, has substantially increased the environmental protection
responsibilities of military commanders. While such responsibilities are
understandably more visible in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
than in combat, under all circumstances the environmental consequences of
military operations remain a legal, moral and public relations concern of the
military commander.
Today, environmental concerns are a significant factor in the calculus of war
and MOOTW. The emergence of this new concern has in turn highlighted what
may be a critical data gap for military commanders and national policy makers:
from a scientific perspective, the impact of combat and of MOOTW on the marine
environment is not well understood. Hence, military commanders and national
policy makers are forced to make decisions based on less than complete
information. Various approaches can be taken regarding this uncertainty. Some
might advocate a precautionary approach, refraining from action unless and until
the probable effects are known and determined to be acceptable. Others might
strike a different balance, allowing unfettered military operations regardless of
environmental consequences, perhaps tempered by control only when science can
demonstrate with certainty unacceptable results. Still others might take a middle
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course, adopting a broad policy of avoiding widespread, clearly evident
degradation, based on the limited available scientific information.
Overlaying this uncertainty is the reality that in order to win during war,
realistic trai~ing must constantly be conducted during peacetime. For purposes
of this paper, peacetime training, whether in U.S. or foreign territorial waters or
on the high seas, is considered a MOOTW. To a large extent, unless specific
mitigation measures are instituted, the environmental risks and impacts of
peacetime training are qualitatively much the same as the risks and impacts that
can be anticipated during war. This begs the question whether different criteria
should be applied to determine acceptable impacts of military operations on the
environment during war versus during MOOTW. Perhaps surprisingly, in the
context of U.S. environmental law, little distinction is made between acceptable
conduct in war versus MOOTW.
This paper will focus on the impacts of combat and MOOTW in an attempt to
resolve three questions. First, what should military commanders and policy makers
know about the physical environment and the impacts of military operations
thereon? This paper asserts that, as a minimum, military commanders and policy
makers must achieve the level of knowledge that is required by legal regimes
applicable to war and MOOTW. Part I of this paper explores the major knowledge
requirements imposed on U.S. commanders by domestic law.
PartII ofthis paper addresses the question ofwhat do we know aboutthe impacts
of war and MOOTW on the marine environment. Through a discussion of some
of the known effects of weaponry, radiation, sound and oil pollution on the marine
environment, it will be shown that our knowledge in these areas is far from
complete.
In its final Part, this paper will suggest an approach for sound policy-making
in the face of incomplete knowledge regarding the impacts of war and MOOTW
on the marine environment.
PART I: WHAT SHOULD BE KNOWN ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF WAR
AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT?

Domestic U.S. law imposes significant knowledge requirements on federal
agencies, including the military, whose actions may affect the marine
environment. The discussion below focuses on the three major statutes imposing
these knowledge requirements.

National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates formal
documentation and full consideration of the environmental impacts of any
proposal for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."l In documenting such impacts, federal agencies must document
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and consider an extremely broad universe ofeffects, including those that are direct,
indirect, cumulative and connected, whether or not such effects are adverse or
beneficial to the environment.2 Recognizing that in some cases adequate scientific
information may not be readily available, the regulations further require agencies
to obtain the necessary information (i.e., do the scientific studies) if the costs
thereof are not "exorbitant.,,3 If the costs are exorbitant, or if the means to ascertain
the information are unknown, then the agency must attempt to evaluate such
impacts based on theoretical approaches or generally accepted scientific research
methods.4
The NEPA statute includes no enforcement provisions. Agency compliance
with NEPA, however, is subject to judicial review throu~h "citizens' suits"lawsuits brought by private citizens or groups against federal agencies.
Accordingly, when preparing environmental documentation, federal agencies
strive mightily and at great expense to include sufficient scientific information to
survive judicial review.
Closely related to NEPA is Executive Order 12114,5 which requires
environmental impact analysis for certain federal actions significantly affecting
the environment of the global commons or of foreign nations. Although extremely
broad in geographic scope, the Order contains numerous exemptions from, and
qualifications to its requirements, which in effect substantially circumscribe its
mandate. The Order specifically disavows creation of any right of action, hence
the threat of potential legal action has not been an inducement for federal agency
action under the Order. Nevertheless, the Order remains a mandate for collection
and consideration ofinformation regarding the effects of military activities on the
marine environment.
In response to the mandates ofNEPA and Executive Order 12114, the Navy
and Marine Corps have conducted numerous environmental studies, large and
small, of the effect of military training operations on the marine environment. The
costs of these studies may range from the low thousands to several million dollars.

Endangered Species Act

u.s. species protection statutes impose very significant scientific knowledge

requirements on federal entities, including military commanders. The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits federal agencies, including the military,
from undertaking any action that would jeopardize the continued existence of
endangered species, or adversely affect their "critical habitat," meaning that
geographic habitat area necessary for the recovery of the species from endangered
status. In order to determine the potential impacts oftheir activities on endangered
species and critical habitat, federal agencies must conduct biological assessments of
their activities.6 These assessments generally involve both literature search and
field study.
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Biological assessments are then provided to the cognizant wildlife agency,
which in turn will issue a biological opinion on the probable impacts of the activity
on endangered species or critical habitat. The biological opinion may indicate that
the proposed action may have no effect, that it will have no effect provided specified
mitigation measures are undertaken, or that the action will jeopardize species and
cannot be mitigated to avoid such impact. A federal action may not proceed in the
face of a jeopardy opinion, unless relief is granted by the Endangered Species
Committee, discussed below.
The ESA's prohibition on "taking" certain species expressly applies to persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction "upon the high seas",1 creating a virtually world-wide
regulatory regime. The statute requires that information developed for
consultation be the "best scientific and commercial data available."s As mandated
by the ESA, the Navy has undertaken a number of consultations to ensure that
operations at sea do not violate statutory requirements.

Marine Mammal Protection Act
Like the ESA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits the
"take" of any marine mammal on the high seas. Under the Act, "harassment" of a
marine mammal is a form of "take." MMPA defines "harassment," in part, as
" ... any act of pursuit, torment or annoyance which ... has the potential to disturb
a marine mammal ... in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral patterns,
including, but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding or
sheltering.,,9 Given the breadth of this definition, virtually any military action at
sea, including routine vessel traffic, could result in a "take." In the preamble to a
draft rule establishing procedures for granting marine mammal harassment
permits, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) specifically cited
generation of marine sound as activity that might require a harassment permit. lO
The draft regulations themselves contemplate ship noise as a potential source of
harassment. ll The draft regulations require permit applicants to submit scientific
information such as: the species and numbers of marine mammals likely to be
found in the vicinity of the activity and, for those likely to be affected, a breakdown
of such animals by age, sex and reproductive condition; the anticipated impact of
the activity on the animals and on their food sources and habitat; and a monitoring
plan to evaluate the actual impact of the activity on marine mammals. l2 NMFS
must then consider the "best scientific evidence" in determining the probable
effect of the activity on marine mammals. 13

Knowledge Requirements in War v. Military Operations Other Than War
As discussed above, U.S. statutes impose significant requirements regarding
the collection and consideration of information relative to military operations in
the marine environment. A related issue is whether this burden is different in
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combat situations than in other scenarios. Common sense suggests, of course, that
during war U.S. commanders should not be required to prepare environmental
impact statements for amphibious assaults, nor obtain a permit for whale
harassment before conducting an attack on enemy shipping.
In reality, U.S. laws imposing information collection and consideration
requirements make litde distinction in environmental requirements between
peacetime and wartime requirements. NEPA provides no war or national
emergency exemption. Implementing regulations provide merely that if
emergency circumstances make it necessary to take action without observance of
NEPA requirements, the agency should consult the Council on Environmental
Quality.14
Neither the Marine Mammal Protection Act nor its implementing regulations
provide a war or national emergency exemption. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the ESA's prohibition against taking endangered species "reveals a conscious
decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary
missions' offederal agencies.,,15 In recent litigation, the United States Coast Guard
argued that its mission has priority over endangered species. The U.S. District
Court judge, in response, threatened an adverse judgment in order to "disabuse
the Coast Guard of its mistaken understanding of the unequivocal message of the
ESA.,,16
In the landmark case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,17 the Supreme Court
upheld an injunction against completion and operation ofa dam costing more than
$100 million. Shordy after that case was decided, however, Congress created the
Endangered Species Committee as a safety valve for relief from the draconian
effects of the ESA. The Committee, consisting of seven Cabinet-level officials, is
empowered to exempt a federal action from ESA requirements upon fmding that
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the action, and that the benefits
of the action outweigh the benefits of conserving the species. 18 In recognition that
ESA mandates could adversely impact military operations, the Act provides that
the Committee must grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense finds that an
exemption is necessary in the interests of national defense. 19 Under existing law
and regulation, however, such exemption could be granted only after considerable
administrative effort, including preparation of a biological assessment and
consultation with the cognizant wildlife agency. These efforts could take weeks or
months. Thus, the availability of the exemption for use in defense related
emergency circumstances, even during war, is not certain.
In summary, the information collection and consideration requirements of U.S.
domestic law are substantial. These responsibilities do not disappear, at least for
purposes of U.S. domestic law, upon the commencement of hostilities.
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PART II: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE IMPACTS OF
WAR AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Having described some of the requirement for scientific information on this
subject, this portion of the paper will now discuss the availability of that
information.
Certain data regarding anticipated effects of combat on the marine environment
is available. For example, information is available on the expected lethal blast radii
of various ordnance, the anticipated persistence in seawater of chemical and
biological weapon agents, and the impact of petroleum in the ocean
environment.20 The actual impact of any given military operation on the marine
environment, of course, would be time and location-specific. Hence, reliance on
existing scientific data in the making of global policy is problematic.
Another difficulty encountered relative to scientific data collection in the
marine environment is the vastness and complexity of the ocean environment
itself. By way of illustration, below are discussed three case studies in which
considerable scientific effort has been expended to assess the impacts of three
different types of potential impacts on the marine environment: radionuclide
release, oil pollution, and sound propagation.

Radionuclide Release in the Arctic
In 1993, the former-Soviet Union released information pertaining to the
dumping of radioactive waste into the Arctic Seas. A paper known as the Yablokov
Report or the "White Paper" was published containing data on both source
locations and the amount and type of solid and liquid waste, high-level waste in
the form of spent nuclear fuel, unfueled nuclear reactors, and discarded vessels
containing radioactive waste.
Subsequently, the U. S. Naval Research Laboratory modeled the dispersion of
those radioactive contaminants in the Arctic and its marginal seas. Source
locations and total amounts of disposed radioactive material are based on the
Yablokov Report. The Navy model investigates only the dispersion of
contaminants once they have entered the water column. Model coverage extends
from the pole to approximately 30 degrees North latitude using a grid resolution
of 0.28 degrees. Several different ten-year model simulations are examined using
the following source types and locations:
Low level solid and liquid waste dumped in both the Kara and Barents Seas;
High level waste, including spent nuclear fuel from reactors dumped along the
Novaya Zemlya coast in the Kara Sea; and
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Rivers emptying into the Kara and Barents Seas; and waste dumped from the nuclear
power plant at Sellafield in the Irish Sea.
Comparisons of the model's results to recent data indicate that both the river
and the Sellafield sources can account for a majority of the radioactivity recently
observed in the Kara Sea. However, when high level radioactive waste is used as
the source in the model, resulting concentrations of radioactivity are predicted
approximately an order of magnitude higher than those actually observed. In
contrast to the predicted impact, these results imply that sources of high level waste
are not leaking significantly into the water column. 21 Were policy development
based only on the initial effects and the predicted impact, inaccurate limits may
be established.
In addition, other sources ofradioactive waste from Russia have led to development
of international policy. In 1993, 237,000 gallons of low-level radioactive waste were
dumped by Russia into the Sea of}apan. An international meeting of37 countries led
to a prohibition on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, with a scientific review
and reassessment to be performed after 2S years. This prohibition was adopted
notwithstanding environmental monitoring indicating no observable adverse
effects as a result of the Russian dumping.

Gulf War Oil Pollution
The Gulf War oil pollution episode is an example of how even the best scientific
methods may not provide accurate predictions of future ecological effects. Studies
of the Gulf War demonstrate that the effects on the environment were not as severe
as first anticipated. Numerous studies were also done on the effects of the war from
both a socio-economic perspective and an ecosystem management perspective,
taking into account the diverse political regimes in the Gulf that would have to
cooperate to effectively manage the region as an ecosystem.
During the Gulf War, a total of 660 million barrels of crude oil were released
into the atmosphere, onto the desert, and into the water. Of the 660 million, 6
million to 11 million barrels of crude oil were intentionally released into the
marine environment by the Iraqi troops, contributing to the world's largest oil
spill to date. 22 The focus of scientific study in the Gulf region has been on the oil
slick caused by the intentional release, particularly because of the amount of oil
that impacted the shoreline and the predictions of the long term impacts of a spill
of such magnitude.
.
Concern for the environment was a part of the wartime operations, with
mitigation of the slick commencing before fighting ceased. Originally, the slick
was predicted to behave like the Norwruz spill of 1983 which exhibited massive
sinking due to strong shamal winds blowing dust onto the oil, causing it to
flocculate and sink. Since its specific gravity is less than 1.0 (the specific gravity
of water), oil cannot physically sink unless it is mixed with sediments or particles
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to make it heavier than water. Fortunately, the Gulf War oil spill did not sink due
to uncharacteristic wind conditions which transported and contained the
unrecovered oil against the eastern shorelines of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Also,
the percentage of floating oil recovered by mechanical means was between 18-37
percent, greater than what is usually possible with mechanical cleanup
(approximately 10 percent), thanks to an unprecedented international-scale effort
in recovery operations. The spilled oil also had a high evaporation rate, estimated
from 40-50 percent. The remaining amount was stranded on shorelines and in
intertidal zones. Much of this was left to recover naturally, thus providing an
opportunity to study the physical processes of weathering and effects of natural
cleanup.23
One year after the spill, the Gulf area provided a unique learning opportunity for
the scientific community as a whole, leading to the largest cooperative scientific
endeavor in the Gulf region. Known as the "Mt. Mitchell Expedition", a lOO-day
multi-disciplinary oceanographic research investigation was organized to form a
comprehensive understanding of the Gulf region and to study the long term effects
and impacts of the oil spill. The expedition was jointly sponsored by the Regional
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), u.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Marine Spill Response Corporation
(MSRC) with the participation of 140 marine scientists from 15 countries. Lasting
from 15 January to 13 July 1992, the expedition facilitated much of the data
collection and synthesis that has been done on the fate and effects of the spill. It
provided a consolidation point and information management system for
science-related studies in the Gulf region and has led to a better understanding of
the effects of the war on the marine environment. The expedition's success was
measured not only by the wealth of scientific data collected, but also in "the strides
made in local, regional, and international environmental awareness and political
cooperation in the Gulf.,,24
The oil was expected to cause gross contamination to the subtidal biological
communities of the Gulf. However, the oil did not behave in the hypothesized
manner. This was largely due to the rapid oil movement and stranding in the
intertidal zone which kept the oil from sinking, and acclimation of the Gulf marine
ecosystem to high petroleum impacts. In the Gulf area, microbial populations have
been regularly exposed to natural seepages of oil that occur in the region. Rapid
oil degradation and transformation rates exist due to the extreme high
temperatures in the region. Significant photo-oxidation of polyaromatic
petroleum compounds also occurs due to the strong solar radiation intensity.25
Overall, studies confirmed that there was very little "sinking" of the oil as
originally predicted. Through subtidal sampling conducted during the Mt.
Mitchell Expedition it was documented that little contamination exists in subtidal
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areas above background levels, relative to the intertidal areas. 26 This leg of the
expedition showed: 1) no evidence oflarge scale sinking as a result of the spill; 2)
high levels of contamination in muddy, sheltered basins with low wave energy;
and 3) oil initially stranded in the intertidal zone did not appear to accumulate in
the subtidal, near shore regions, as might have been expected. Often it was difficult
to differentiate whether the source of contamination that was measurable in the
subtidal regions was from the Gulf War spill (intentional release), oil from sunken
vessels, or oil residue from previous spills.27
In reviewing the compilation of data and analyses of scientific studies on the
effects ofthe Gulf War on the environment, it was found that interpretations of
the overall "impact" are varied. But taken as a whole, we cannot say definitively
either way that there was a catastrophic "effect," or any effect at all. The answer
lies somewhere in between and is dependent upon the particular parameter being
measured and the assumptions being made. One must be careful in trying to make
an overarching statement in the extremes, particularly when trying to determine
the effects of something as complex as the Gulf War. Some of the long term effects
are not fully known; more time is needed to determine if the Gulf ecosystem will
recover to its pre-war state. Most experts speculate that it will not return to its
original state, although complete data on the initial conditions of the Gulf
ecosystem is also limited. The NOAA chief scientist explained the Gulf situation
best in stating that "the Gulf (environment) has changed because of the 1991
conflict; how dramatically it has changed still remains to be seen.,,28

Sound Propagation in the Marine Environment: The Acoustic
Thermometry o/Ocean Climate (ATOC) Project
In many cases, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy are leading
research to determine the environmental effect of military operations. The
Congress established the Strategic Environmental Research and Development
Program (SERDP) on November 5,1990 through Public Law 101-510 to address
environmental matters of concern to the DOD and Department of Environment
(DOE). It is conducted as a tri-agencyprogram with participation from the DOD,
DOE, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The SERDP identifies and
develops technology to enhance capabilities to meet environmental
commitments, and fosters the exchange of scientific information and
technologies among governmental agencies and the private sector. Funding for
the SERDP has stabilized at about $50M per year for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996.
Under the aegis of the SERDP, there are several programs directly addressing
concerns articulated at this Symposium. Over $50M of SERDP funds are
encumbered by the Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate (ATO C) project.29
By sending pulses of underwater sound through the deep ocean basins, scientists
hope to settle the question of whether the predicted "greenhouse effect" has begun
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to warm the planet. This experiment exploits the fact that the speed of sound in
water depends on the water's temperature; the warmer the water, the faster sound
propagates through it. Any significant change in the speed at which sound
traverses several thousand miles of seawater would mean a change in the average
temperature of the water through which the sound passed. By careful
measurements repeated over a decade or so, it can be demonstrated that seasonal
and annual trends are dampened and average global and/or basin scale ocean
temperature changes could be resolved with sufficient accuracy to validate or
discount greenhouse effect estimates. The generally accepted estimate of
greenhouse warming at the ocean-atmosphere boundary is 20 millidegrees Celsius
per year, decreasing exponentially to 5 millidegrees per year at the depth of the
Deep Sound Channel. The ATOC experiment has the potential to demonstrate
that a single quantitative global warming signal of 4-5 millidegrees per year at 1
kilometer ocean depth (average Deep Sound Channel depth) could be confirmed
at the 95% statistical confidence level in a ten-year observation period. 30
Concurrently, a detailed picture of ocean thermal patterns can be deduced which
has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of naval systems.
A strong marine biology program is tightly coupled to the ATOC research
effort. Although permits from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
were in process, project execution was delayed in 1994 when protests from the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council
forced the NMFS to reconsider and require full Environmental Impact Statements
(EIS). Opinions regarding the effects of the experiment greatly varied. Hal
Whitehead, a whale researcher at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, stated that
"the effects of the sounds on marine mammals could range from deafening,
through hearing loss, to disturbances in feeding or socializing, to long-term
psychological effects.,,31 Most scientists are convinced that there is no evidence
that even extremely loud low-frequency noises emitted by supertanker propellers
or the underwater blasts from offshore oil explorers and drilling platforms cause
damage to marine mammals. The animals may be "annoyed" by the sounds, but
they are certainly not endangered. Further, a report from the Ocean Studies Board
of the National Academy of Sciences states that although there is an absence of
hard data, "it appears that low-frequency sound, even at high levels, is barely
audible to them.,,32 As a calibration point, ATOC proposed transmitting a 260
watt, 60 to 90 Hertz pulsed signal 2% of the time - 20 minutes on, 4 hours off, every
fourth day at a depth of 1000 meters. This noise signal is about one-tenth as
powerful as the sound emitted by a typical supertanker.33
After nearly two years of discussion, the Marine Mammal Protection Act permit
for an ATOC source in California was granted in the Spring of 1995. A permit for
the Hawaii source remains in process. This situation is a typical example of policy
and regulation that has proceeded without sufficient or reasonable knowledge of
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actual effects. These regulatory events result in decreased National Security
capabilities at increasing cost, without significantly improving the basis to
construct a reasonable and workable policy.
The previous case studies illustrate the importance of a complete knowledge
base in forming a complete assessment of the environmental threat of any type of
marine operation. This knowledge base should consist of known initial
environmental conditions, short and long term effects, and the actual impacts.
After evaluating the case studies, an evaluation of the knowledge base concerning
the environmental threat of military operations can be performed. This knowledge
base is in fact very thin and, with few exceptions, contains a great deal of
uncertainty. Thus, it is not surprising that very little capability exists to make
adequate impact assessments except where there is a similar activity in the civilian
or commercial sectors. For the most part, military research has focused upon the
military effectiveness ofweapons systems, rather than on the environmental effects
thereof.
PART III: COPING WITH SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY REGARDING
THE IMPACT OF WAR AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

As the above discussion indicates, collection and analysis of data regarding the
impacts of combat on the marine environment is a massive and complex
undertaking. Even with concerted study efforts over time, it remains difficult to
predict with a great deal of certainty the long term impacts ofcombat on the marine
environment. Because decisions regarding military impacts on the marine
environment will necessarily be made, by default if not through deliberate process,
some means of dealing with this scientific uncertainty is required.
What are the ramifications of this scientific uncertainty on military commanders
and policy makers? From a domestic law standpoint, the limited knowledge base
creates a risk of being challenged for noncompliance with domestic requirements,
with the ever-present possibility of disruptive enforcement action. From an
international standpoint, the limited knowledge base creates other risks. With the
benefit of historical hindsight, our activities at sea will be judged in light ofactual long
term impacts, whether adequately anticipated by the scientific community or not. It
is the unavoidable burden of the policy maker to assume the risk of scientific
uncertainty when striking the appropriate b~ance between unrestricted military
operations and environmental protection.
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